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This paper focuses on the gap between the theory and practice of community-based feminist activism and calls 
for feminists to develop new decision-making models that are more congruent with the legal and bureaucratic 
environment of community-based feminist activism. 
RESUME 
Mon article est centre^  sur l'ecart entre la theorie et la pratique de l'activisme feministe operant dans la 
communaute et invite les feminstes a develloper de nouveaux modeles de prise de decision qui s'harmonisent 
mieux avec le milieu judiciaire et administratif oil evolue l'activisme feministe operant dans la communaute. 
INTRODUCTION 
In their pioneering study, Women and 
Social Change: Feminist Activism in Canada. 
Jeri Wine and Janice Ristock claim that 
feminist organizations—whatever form they 
take—are designed to bridge divisions between 
feminists in academic and non-academic 
communities and to be the sites of feminist 
praxis, which they define as "the melding of 
theory and practice"( 1991:254). Organizations 
of this type commonly use an egalitarian, 
consensual model of decision-making. But 
how useful is the model in the real world of 
community-based feminist activism? This 
paper will develop two arguments: first, that 
our egalitarian structure of decision-making 
does not take into account the external 
legal-bureaucratic environment many 
community activists operate in and secondly, 
that the consensus method we use to make 
decisions can, on occasion, be a major 
impediment to effective collective action. 
E G A L I T A R I A N DECISION-MAKING 
STRUCTURE 
For Lena Dominelli and Eileen McLeod, 
the goal of both the theory and practice of 
feminist activism is to create egalitarian social 
relations, and they describe feminist 
campaigns and networks as "the locations and 
incubators of egalitarian relations" (1989: 67). 
In simple terms, this means that all active 
members in an organization—whether it is an 
advocacy group or a women's centre—have 
equal influence and power and an equal voice 
around the table. No power distinctions are 
made between members and staff of a feminist 
organization or even between members and 
non-members such as volunteers who work on 
specific projects. We are all equal in the eyes 
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of feminist theorists. But how realistic is this 
in practice? 
To be eligible for government funding, 
women's centres and other community-based 
women's groups in British Columbia are 
required to be incorporated as non-profit 
societies. The law of the province governing 
these organizations makes a legal distinction 
between elected members and staff. Elected 
members of a feminist collective, just like 
directors on a conventional 'malestream' board, 
are legally responsible for the affairs of their 
group. They are also collectively designated as 
the employer with the power to hire and fire 
staff and to set the terms and conditions of 
employment. 
This legal distinction in the BC Society 
Act between elected and non-elected members 
of non-profit organizations, in effect, imposes 
a power differential on our decision-making 
structure that wil l not go away just because 
feminist activists refuse to acknowledge that it 
exists. In my view, our failure to recognize this 
externally-imposed power differential and to 
be clear and honest about our respective roles 
has created nothing less than havoc in several 
feminist organizations across Canada, 
including the well-publicized case of Nellie's 
Hostel in Toronto where intense board-staff 
conflicts over the issues of racism and 
homophobia almost forced the closure of the 
shelter (see Freedman 1993). The survival of 
a women's centre in Victoria was also 
threatened by public allegations of abuses of 
power by the elected members of its collective 
(see Scott 1995). 
The external environment also imposes 
another type of power differential on feminist 
organizations that depend mainly on 
government funding. A l l funding agencies 
require that certain elected members of the 
group—usually the chair and treasurer—are 
held accountable for the expenditure of 
taxpayers' money. The fine print of funding 
contracts spells out the dire consequences of 
non-compliance for these individual officers as 
well as the collective as a whole. 
In my view, this requirement also 
needs to be recognized in some way in our 
decision-making structure. Currently, 
however, theories of community-based 
feminist activism suggest that power and 
influence are shared equally by all members of 
the group. But the bureaucratic-legal reality is 
that they do not have equal responsibility for 
what goes on. 
C O N S E N S U A L DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS 
In community-based groups, 
decision-making often takes place in an 
organizational form known as "a collective" 
which is a consensual, egalitarian or 
non-hierarchical group. A l l members of the 
collective have an equal voice and equal 
decision-making power around the table. 
Discussion takes place in a round where each 
woman, i f she chooses, shares her personal 
thoughts and feelings. The purpose of the 
discussion is to arrive at a consensus on an 
issue, and consensus, usually defined as 
unanimous agreement, replaces a majority vote 
as the method of deciding what to do. 
In my experience, consensual 
decision-making works well in small groups 
where everyone knows and trusts one another 
and shares a common passion about a cause 
whether it be a common faith (e.g., Quakers) 
or a common interest in a relatively narrowly 
defined issue (e.g., women's poverty). Without 
this communality of interest, though, the 
consensual decision-making process becomes 
a major impediment to effective collective 
action. Why? 
Research on the Alberta Status of 
Women Action Committee revealed that 
rounds often become "personal group therapy 
sessions" resulting in situations where people 
are incapable of moving to the next step, and 
also that once this committee adopted the 
practice of rounds and other features of the 
collective model, it became known as "the 
Board that didn't do anything" (Blais 1992: 
98). 
The consensual decision-making process 
can also be very exhausting and frustrating, 
resulting in burnout. It offers little opportunity 
for dialogue. Instead, to quote Joni Mitchell, it 
often goes 'round and round like the circle 
game.' This happens because process on its 
own has no sense of priorities. As a result, 
community-based activists often find 
themselves in a situation where the consensual 
process becomes more important than the 
outcome. Unanimity, however, is not really an 
option in a polarized situation. As well, in my 
experience, the practice of rounds is not 
immune from ego-tripping and manipulation. 
For example, where you sit in the circle may 
determine when you speak and the timing of 
your intervention can be important in 
influencing the outcome. While I have no 
problem with individual voices having an 
opportunity to be heard, not all feminist 
activists appreciate that decision-making 
involves compromising one's perspective, 
one's resources, and one's place at the table. 
In conclusion, I think we need to 
consider developing different decision-making 
models that take into account the external legal 
and bureaucratic realities within which 
community-based feminist activism takes 
place, but without compromising the principles 
underlying 'traditional' feminist process. 
Experiments with different structures are 
already taking place at the grassroots level. For 
example, a women's centre in Victoria has 
revised its constitution to clarify the respective 
roles of elected and staff members; and an 
aboriginal women's centre in Ottawa is using 
a modified collective that combines a 
consensus-based structure with guidance from 
a grandmothers' advisory council (see Lahey, 
1996). 
While ad hoc experiments of this type 
are valuable, they are not sufficient on their 
own to overcome the limitations of'traditional' 
feminist process. There still remains the 
pressing need for feminists in academic and 
non-academic communities to develop 
together new decision-making models. These 
models need to take into account, while still 
challenging, the limitations that 
legal-bureaucratic structures impose on 
community-based feminist organizations and 
the internal weaknesses that impede, at times, 
effective collective action. 
ENDNOTE 
1. I would like to thank Dr. Katie 
Cooke, Barbara LeBlanc, Brishkai 
Lund and Dr. Margo Matwychuk for 
their encouragement and valuable 
feedback. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Blais, Monica. "Feminist Practice in Alberta 
in the 1980s: A Study of the Lobby for the 
Alberta Advisory Council on Women's 
Issues." M . A . Thesis, Department of 
Sociology, University of Alberta (1992). 
Dominelli, Lena and Eileen McLeod. 
Feminist Social Work f!989^ London: 
Macmillan. 
Freedman, Adele. "White Woman's Burden." 
Saturday Nieht r April 1993): 40-44, 74-84. 
Scott, Andrea. "Power Troubles Rock 
Women's Group." Monday Magazine (June 
15-21, 1995): 3-4. 
Wine, Jeri Dawn and Janice L . Ristock, eds. 
Women and Social Change: Feminist 
Activism in Canada (1991) Toronto: James 
Lorimer. 
Lahey, Anita. "Share the Power." Herizons 
10 (Spring 1996): 15-16. 
